**Boundaries of patriotism. Geography and ethics of mobilization in WWI France.**

Pierre Purseigle, University of Warwick - Trinity College Dublin

At the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, France was still coming to terms with the political, social and economic transformations, which had defined the history of Modern Europe since the late eighteenth-century. “Children of the Revolution”, the French were first dealing with a host of institutional and ideological questions that the establishment of the Third Republic in 1871 had not settled.[[1]](#footnote-1) In particular, the relationship between the state, the Catholic Church and the army still crystallized a fraught and divisive debate over national identity and political loyalty that the Dreyfus Affair had dramatically illustrated. In the meantime, economic modernization and internal migration were slowly but surely transforming the country's rural society. Finally, French leaders and commentators were still bemoaning demographic trends, which underpinned heated discussions of national decline in the challenging European context created by German unification and the crushing military defeat of 1871. Across the political spectrum, many, like Louis Suquet a Parisian engineer, doubted that France had the material, institutional and cultural strengths to withstand the trials of war.

As to patriotic matters, skepticism and disillusionment were in fashion. We believed that revolution would ensue the war; that the mobilization would be sabotaged; in short, we were convinced of our incapacity.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Yet the national mobilization for war in 1914 was an indisputable success that surprised military planners and political leaders alike.[[3]](#footnote-3) Despite the inauspicious beginnings and the unprecedented material and human costs of war, France overcame a series of crises that culminated in the 1917 mutinies. France held out however and eventually saw the conflict through. The Republican nation-state emerged victorious and, to a large extent, reinforced by the war.[[4]](#footnote-4) However, in view of the polarization of French political and social life in the interwar years and of the subsequent failure to enact another victorious mobilization in 1939-1940, one may legitimately wonder about the nature and transformations of French patriotism in the First World War.[[5]](#footnote-5)

To a large extent, the necessity and difficulty to understand the resilience of French society in the face of industrial warfare has spurred the renewal of First World War studies in France since the late 1970s. While the French historiography of the Great War remains particularly dynamic, a long-lasting academic controversy has unfortunately constrained the analysis of wartime mobilization within a misleading alternative between consent and coercion. A legitimate and most-needed debate about the respective importance of patriotic mobilization and state-enforced discipline degenerated into a full-blown dispute back in 1998.[[6]](#footnote-6) Pitting two schools of interpretation that respectively stress the popular consent to the war and the coercive power of the state apparatus, this debate continues to be artificially framed as a conventional opposition between cultural and social historians.[[7]](#footnote-7) Further understanding of French patriotism in the era of the First World War suffered as a result. This chapter takes issue with what one may call - for lack of a better term - the “consensualist” view of wartime mobilization that both sides of the argument paradoxically share. Indeed, the idea that wartime mobilization stemmed from the “*Union Sacrée*” and from a rather improbable national consensus remains surprisingly prevalent across the divide drawn by the controversy. For S. Audoin-Rouzeau, A. Becker and many others, national mobilization was the effect and product of a patriotic consensus crystallized by war violence into a specific “war culture”[[8]](#footnote-8); for R. Cazals, F. Rousseau, N. Offenstadt, and A. Loez, strikes and mutinies demonstrate that national mobilization was only made possible and maintained by the exercise of state coercion and propaganda.[[9]](#footnote-9) Though they draw opposite conclusions from the French war experience, both interpretations therefore seem to share the same premise; namely that only national consensus could underpin wartime national mobilization. They also - surprisingly and unwittingly perhaps - collude in neglecting patriotism as a category of political analysis.[[10]](#footnote-10) On the one hand, proponents of the “war culture” paradigm stress the symbolic and emotional dimensions of “national sentiment”.[[11]](#footnote-11) Drawing on anthropology, literary scholarship, and art history, they rarely mobilize the categories of political history, which were key to the works of an earlier generation represented by Jean-Jacques Becker and Antoine Prost. On the other side of the argument, their opponents seem reluctant to evoke patriotism, for fear perhaps of finding evidence of it.[[12]](#footnote-12) In any case, they appear unwilling or unable to reconcile the existence of social or regional tensions with the possibility of commitment to national defense.[[13]](#footnote-13)

This chapter will underline the need to locate patriotism by considering its valence in the particular social and geographic contexts that determined the war experience at the front or at home. It will also suggest the necessity to re-politicize national sentiment while maintaining the necessary distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Notwithstanding nationalist rhetoric, patriotism is not a political project expressed in ideological terms but a sense of belonging; a sense of loyalty mobilized in the face of an existential emergency or crisis.

This distinction is not simply of relevance to the continuing historiographical debate. In the current commemorative context, it is also critical if historians are to successfully challenge the growing assertion of regionalist and essentialist definitions of social identities that threaten to undermine the public understanding of the conflict. It is indeed striking to see how the centenary of the war and the flurry of activities, events, and publications it is generating are reactivating conventional as well as regional narratives of victimization. These also build on and appropriate the kind of rhetoric deployed by those activists and intellectuals who have been calling for France to reckon with the crimes and moral legacies of imperialism.[[14]](#footnote-14) Like those who legitimately agitate for the integration of colonial soldiers into the national memory of the war, regionalist writers evoke soldiers of Languedoc, Corsica, Britanny or the Basque country as sacrificial victims of the French centralizing and nationalizing project.[[15]](#footnote-15) In this regard, France is just another example of a multicultural society grappling with the memory of wars fought in the name of the nation-state.

This chapter wagers that wartime patriotism ought to be considered as part of a larger reflection on the mobilization of space and place in the era of the Great War. Historians of the First World War have indeed long assumed that the process of nationalization of the French polity had reached its apex in August 1914. In recent years, a string of works on France and Germany in particular have however demonstrated that nation-making and centralization had not systematically entailed the gradual withering of local identities.[[16]](#footnote-16) In this respect, the urban history of the First World War offers a useful vantage point and furthers our understanding of the process of wartime national mobilization in France. It stresses and revaluates the importance of contention in the urban experience of the war; for social movements and conflicts did not merely demonstrate the frailty of the consensus stipulated by the prescriptions of nationalism. In fact, urban contention constituted a critical mediation of the war experience, whereby national and infra-national identities were asserted, mobilized, and played out on the urban stage. Urban civil societies thus ensured, to a large extent, the success of national mobilization in France. It is also perhaps at that level that the contingent, ongoing, and contested nature of these mobilizations appears most clearly. It therefore sheds critical light on both the nature and mobilization of patriotic cultures in WWI France.

For the purpose of this chapter, the analysis will focus on the Mediterranean periphery of Republican France and specifically on the town of Béziers. At the heart of what used to be known as the *Midi Rouge* – the red south -, Béziers encapsulated the political culture of a region where the strong local identity had traditionally been seen as a challenge to the centralization process and to the national state. This chapter will first consider the articulation of patriotism and local repertoires of contention before 1914. It will then scrutinize the wartime mobilization of wartime identities and approach the military experience of the locality. It will approach the ethical dimensions of the process of patriotic mobilization and will finally underline the specificities of wartime politics.

**1- The “Meridional Question” - Patriotism and local repertoires of contention**

On June the 21st 1907, soldiers of the 17th Infantry Regiment left their barracks in Agde and marched to Béziers in protest against the suppression of the local winegrowers' revolt. Their mutiny was the climax of a crisis, which had been convulsing the southern part of France since March of that year. The mutineers improvised a billet in the heart of this meridional town, where they were photographed, holding the butt of their rifles in the air, surrounded by townsmen and women. This remains, to this day, one of the most enduring images conjured up by the name of Béziers. The mutiny of the soldiers of the 17th went on to gain iconic status in the French pacifist tradition thanks to the song composed soon after the events by Montéhus.[[17]](#footnote-17) These soldiers, recruited and stationed in the local area, had come to embody the unreliable nature of the southern regions, whose local identity was deemed to threaten the integrity of the French Nation-State. The challenge they so dramatically issued to the military authorities underlines the problematic nature of the articulation between local and national identity in France at the turn of the twentieth century. Yet, when the First World War broke out in August 1914, Béziers responded unreservedly to the call to arms. In this particular urban context, the indisputable success of national mobilization questions conventional interpretations of the process of nationalization. It also invites us to rethink our understanding of patriotism and to place wartime mobilization in the broader context of social mobilization and contention in the early twentieth century.

Béziers, known as the “wine capital”, stood at the heart of a region entirely dedicated to wine-growing and was a major centre of the national and European wine markets. A few indicators illustrate the extent to which the economic destiny of the town was inseparable from the success of the local intoxicant. In 1914, the department of the Hérault, where Béziers is located, produced over a quarter of the national wine production (27.9%). In the district (arrondissement) of Béziers, vines covered 77.7% of the land and generated 90.4% of the local revenue.[[18]](#footnote-18) The town's dependency on the wine market had first been dramatically demonstrated between 1873 and 1881 when the phylloxera – a vine's pest – destroyed a large part of the southern vineyard. Eventually restored thanks to the import of Californian grafts, the local winemaking industry then took a decidedly capitalist turn. Although the modernization of the local economy ushered in a prosperous “Golden Age” in the last ten years of the nineteenth century, it also entrenched for decades to come the town's dependency on the wine market; a vulnerability illustrated by the 1907 uprising.[[19]](#footnote-19)

By 1900, the dominant political culture in Béziers revealed a high degree of acculturation to the national political life despite its strong oppositional tradition. Indeed the town enjoyed a well-established reputation of political radicalism and conflicts had, in several occasions, pitted the local community against national institutions. Yet, this radical heritage, mobilized effectively in times of local or national crisis, contributed to a significant extent to resolving apparent tensions and contradictions between the assertion and sustainment of local identity and the consolidation of the nation-state.

The dominant political culture in Béziers was typical of the *Midi Rouge*, a large swath of the southern part of France where an advanced form of radical republicanism held sway and where socialism and syndicalism had precociously developed. Béziers, in particular, was a secularist stronghold where the local progressives celebrated a tradition of opposition to the centralized state, exemplified in the town's resistance to the 1851 coup which had inaugurated the Second Empire. By the turn of the century, however, the local Radical Party, supported by the influential Masonic lodges, illustrated the conservative evolution of the regime, now identified with the middle and upper-middle classes and the established political and social order. The town's *Député* (M.P.), Louis Lafferre (1861-1929) embodied what many deemed to be the drift of the Radical Party he had co-founded in 1901. Lafferre could nonetheless rely on the staunch militant secularism of many of his constituents to thwart the rising Socialist challenge. A growing presence in the associational landscape, the Socialists had adopted an idiosyncratic positioning, determined by the local socio-economic conditions. In fact, up until the 1920s, the structure of landownership in the area hampered the development of a truly collectivist and revolutionary programme for most agricultural labourers also enjoyed the benefits of private ownership.

These socio-economic characteristics accounted for the evolution and balance of the local political forces. In 1907, the crisis had not only pitted the local community against the government over the fate of the winemaking industry. It had also forced a redefinition of political allegiances. Though Lafferre's parliamentary seat remained safe, a group of independent radicals and socialists standing for “communal interests” defeated his allies in the subsequent municipal elections.

Right-wing organizations in Béziers were so weak that they effectively teetered on the brink of irrelevance. The reaction of their mouthpiece, *Le Publicateur*, to the election of the Socialist Barthe in the town's second constituency shows, however, that by 1914 the defence of the local industry had become the overarching principle around which local political life revolved. Despite its staunch Catholicism and virulent anti-republicanism, *Le Publicateur* could not help paying tribute to Barthe, whom had “the right to be proud of its success, for one must admit that he ensured it through his boundless dedication to the cause of winemaking.”[[20]](#footnote-20)

The evidence offered by the history of Béziers therefore sit uneasily with Eugen Weber's take on the nationalization of the French masses; a process he assimilated to colonization:

“We are talking about the process of acculturation: the civilization of the French by urban France, the disintegration of local cultures by modernity and their absorption into the dominant civilization of Paris and the schools.”[[21]](#footnote-21)

*Pace* Weber, local identities withstood the forces of modernization and were still relevant by 1914. But how did these populations articulate their urban, local and national identities? The study of social movements such as the 1907 meridional crisis provides an answer to this question. It also reveals how the politics of place operated in the decades before and during the First World War.

The 1907 crisis resulted, quite simply, from the overproduction of poor quality wine that the market could no longer absorb. As winegrowers had given priority to yield over quality, wine prices fell dramatically. The southern vineyards were therefore in a constant state of crisis between 1901 and 1909. Imports from Algeria and the fraudulent production of wine, offered convenient explanations for the woes of the winemaking Midi. After a 1905 law had lowered tax on sugar however, fraudsters and the northern beet growers were singled out for condemnation, while the State's inaction was increasingly perceived as hostile indifference. The crisis crystallized on 11 March 1907 when a delegation of winegrowers from the small village of Argelliers met with a parliamentary inquiry commission. Thenceforth, the protests, demonstrations and meetings across southern France grew exponentially. On 12 May, 120,000 persons converged on Béziers, and on the 9th of June, half a million people brought their grievances into the streets of Montpellier, the regional capital city. The demonstrators were accusing fraudsters and beet growers in the north to put their very livelihood in jeopardy and calling upon the State to protect winemakers. The interpellation of the national authorities took a dramatic turn when the Argelliers Committee asked winegrowers and their supporters to withhold from paying their tax, and asked the municipal assemblies to resign in protest at the Republic's inaction. A month earlier, a riot had already forced the Mayor of Béziers to resign. On the 19th of June in Narbonne, the army's intervention left protesters mourning the first victim of the revolt. Two days later, the 17th Infantry Regiment mutinied in Béziers and seemingly threatened to transform a social movement into a fully-fledged insurrection. Clemenceau, the Head of Government, cunningly destabilized the movement's leadership, increased the military presence in the south and finally restored public order. The movement gradually ran out of steam after the passing of an anti-fraud law on the 29th of June.

Legitimately concerned about the state of the local industry, protesters expressed a deeper anxiety; for they feared economic depression would ultimately lead to the disappearance of their way of life. This was, in their eyes, no less than a life-and-death struggle, an existential fight that cut across classes and overrode social and political antagonism. As the Socialist mayor of Narbonne, Ernest Ferroul put it on 16 June 1907:

“Forgetting our fratricidal wars and whatever has divided us until now, we are defending the native land, the nourishing soil and its products. Is it not legitimate? When the black flag flies over our town halls, when we are demanding Right and Justice, one is sniggering, saying we are reactionaries. We are not monarchists, opportunists, radicals, or socialists any more; we are nothing but Southerners who demand the right to live.”[[22]](#footnote-22)

Unity was the order of the day and the leaders of the movement as well professional organizations insisted on fostering class collaboration. For the majority of demonstrators concurred on one fundamental point: it was up to the unitary Republic to save her Meridional constituents. Even where Occitan appeared to supplant French as the language of contention, such vocal assertion of regional identity did not entail a rejection of the universalist Republic.[[23]](#footnote-23) The regionalist interpretation of the 1907 events gained a new vigour in the 1970s when Occitanist organizations rose from the ashes of earlier regionalist movements. In these post-1968 reconstructions, even though the mutiny of the 17th Infantry Regiment had only lasted a day, it assumed a paradigmatic value: here was a regiment largely made up of men born and bred around Béziers, who had stood up to the coercive machine of the nation state to demonstrate where their loyalty lay by refusing to suppress the revolt of their kith and kin. Regionalists, though, remain as misleading as Eugen Weber who refused to acknowledge that the events of 1907 provided a corrective to his modernizing model. In many ways, the protesters had indeed demonstrated their acculturation to the national and Republican political culture. But the mutiny, as well as the resignation of municipal councils across the region, also illustrated the tension between legality and legitimacy. Popular sovereignty, however, was not here understood in conventional Universalist terms. The mutineers had demonstrated that popular sovereignty had communal roots that Republican institutions could simply not afford to ignore.

**2- The wartime mobilization of urban identities, 1914-1918**

Historians have now demonstrated that the outbreak of war in 1914 did not lead to an eruption of nationalism.[[24]](#footnote-24) The conflict was nonetheless to be a protracted trial of the nations as it challenged the very fabric of the belligerent societies. The modalities of urban mobilization in 1914-1918 therefore sheds light on the patriotic practices elicited by the war effort: the support of local military units, the assistance to war victims, various charitable initiatives, and the commemoration of military service. This perspective allows us to scrutinize the languages as well as the performance of patriotism as sacrifice, citizenship and philanthropy.[[25]](#footnote-25) Wartime mobilization ran across and along the boundaries of multiple social and cultural spheres. It revealed the plurality of urban identities and the complex set of concomitant senses of belonging that affected and hallmarked the commitment to the national war effort.

In towns and cities across the belligerent nations, the local elites reflected and shaped the social responses to the conflict. The wartime discourses and iconography produced by civic authorities, newspapers and voluntary organizations show how local elites used the main symbols of local identity to stress that victory would belong to the urban community as well as to the nation. The wartime systems of representations thus rested on a process of acculturation, on the appropriation of the national narratives through local cultural codes.

In Béziers, the vision of the war offered to the local community fell into line with the national mobilization whose ‘totalizing logic' enlisted the cultural, moral, and ideological commitment of each nation to fight an uncivilized enemy to its capitulation. Defeat was not merely construed in military and strategic terms but was synonymous with the end of one's culture, identity, and way of life. The dominant discourses on the war therefore presented the conflict as a defensive one imposed on France and Britain by German aggression.[[26]](#footnote-26) Beyond conservative and nationalist groups, Béziers radicals concurred with the majority of local socialists in presenting the Entente as the last bulwark against the German autocracy and militarism that was threatening Democracy. In other words, besides the denunciation of a barbaric enemy and the evocation of the German ‘atrocities', the ideological vindication of the conflict echoed the dominant political culture and such propinquity certainly strengthened its purchase among the town's population.

The local dimensions of the martial involvement of the population first appeared in the representation of the threat posed to the local identities. Since the war was ultimately waged to preserve everyday values, the local elite immediately resorted to some specific figures to underline the mobilization of local communities. Local cultural codes were also used in the debasement of the enemy and underpinned the local vision of an intrinsically inferior German. In Béziers, the organizers of charity days turned to the main symbols of local identity, namely vine and wine, to stress that Victory would belong to the local community as well as to the Nation. In a somewhat traditional depiction of the rapacious and barbaric ‘Boche', the enemy is defeated by Bacchus and a jolly ‘Poilu' both sitting astride a wine barrel.[[27]](#footnote-27) Here the opposition is made blatant between the wine-drinking southern Frenchman and the beer-drinking, grape-treading German. The utilization of specific local schemas of representation ensured a perfect understanding and reception of wartime propaganda.

The success of the patriotic days that explicitly pandered to civic pride cannot merely be dismissed as the result of “patriotic marketing” as it has recently been argued.[[28]](#footnote-28) National elites could not impose participation from above and their involvement does not explain why such initiatives raised more money than other charitable events. In fact, their success underlined the potency of local identities in the process of mobilization. During the war, local communities established an order of priorities that stressed, for instance, the necessity of propping up the local economy and of supporting the towns' traders at the expense of their national or regional rivals. A more significant example was the organization of assistance to war victims, which was not only organized at the local level but was also primarily directed at the members of the local communities. But these discriminatory processes were not a crude expression of local selfishness that, after all, might have been vindicated by the scarcity of available resources. The success of the wartime mobilization rested on a set of discriminatory processes that structured the local commitment to national defence. Local solidarities and identities ultimately reinforced national resilience.

This process of local appropriation of the war contributed to the plurality of the war cultures that sustained national mobilization. More often than not, the language and practices of patriotism eschewed the lofty and abstract vocabulary of nationalism. Instead, the defence of the nation was commonly articulated in communitarian terms and framed in the language of urban, class, or religious solidarities.[[29]](#footnote-29) Notwithstanding the rhetoric of professional patriotic orators, this war of national defence was soon construed as a personal battle for the safety of one's family and home. This chapter contends that the very conventional nature of national sentiment - the mundanity of patriotism - accounts for its resilience in the face of industrial warfare.

**3- The military experience of the locality**

Enrolled in mass armies, the combatants of the First World War remained, first and foremost, civilians in uniform. As a result, the solidarity between front and home front remained a problematic issue throughout the conflict. Deemed critical to the cohesion of belligerent societies by political and military leaders alike, it remains central to our current historiographical discussions. In France, like in other belligerent countries, local identity enabled soldiers and civilians to mediate their experience and to conjure up their solidarity. From a comparative standpoint however, it is critical to stress how the organization of military recruitment impacted on the local mediations of the wartime national experience.

In France, conscription was part and parcel of the national Revolutionary heritage, the modern manifestation of the *levée en masse*, the republican concept of the nation in arms.[[30]](#footnote-30) Though the 1907 mutiny had illustrated the distance between the local populations and the military institution, it did not follow that Meridional France had renounced patriotism. As a matter of fact, when the war came in August 1914, the recruitment centre of Béziers registered half as many draft dodgers as the country as a whole (0.89% against 1.5%).[[31]](#footnote-31) Yet, the image and reputation of the Meridional soldiers proved extremely resilient throughout the war and also explain the virulence of the so-called ‘15th Army Corp polemic'.

This polemic broke out in the autumn of 1914 when, after a series of defeats, southern regiments fighting within the 15th and 16th Army Corps were accused of having fallen back under the enemy's fire. Some politicians and national newspapers invoked the ‘indolence' of the southerners held responsible for this retreat. This polemic reactivated traditional stereotypes and the opposition between the South (*Midi*) and the North that were translated through publications and private correspondence alike.[[32]](#footnote-32) Problematic as a result, the local appropriation of the war experience had been made even more difficult by the relocation after the 1907 mutiny of the 17th Infantry Regiment; a unit with which the town had had a long-established relationship. This makes all the more remarkable the efforts made by the local elites and by the town council in particular to strengthen the links with the 96th Infantry Regiment which had succeeded to the 17th. These efforts culminated in 1917 when the Town Council officially proclaimed that the 96th had obtained its ‘droit de cité', a revealing turn of phrase denoting both acceptance and citizenship.[[33]](#footnote-33)

At the front, the life of meridional soldiers differs little - if at all - from that of their fellow countrymen or counterparts across the line. Yet the French historiography of the Great War has for the best part of four decades ascribed them an eminent role in the discussion of frontline experience. This is, in no small part, due to the impact of the memoirs of Louis Barthas, a barrel maker and socialist activist, whose remarkable testimony was published in 1978 at the initiative of Rémy Cazals.[[34]](#footnote-34) The first in a long and still growing series of diaries and memoirs written by “ordinary” soldiers, Barthas's recollections captured the imagination of a large readership. In a vivid and often cynical prose, Barthas tells a war story that resonated with many veterans and their descendants. Recalling the misery and horrors of industrial warfare, Barthas recounted trench life from the point of view of the common soldiers and NCOs. Castigating French commanders for their murderous incompetence, Barthas denounced the war as well as the empty rhetoric of nationalism. A fascinating and gripping text, his memoirs rejected any notion of patriotic mobilization and exemplify a Socialist and pacifist vision of the war. Born a few kilometers away from Béziers, Barthas served in the 296th Infantry Regiment, the reserve of the town's 96th. It is therefore useful to place his testimony alongside that of other local soldiers, like that of Georges Crassous.

A winegrower from the district of Béziers, Crassous had, like Barthas, benefitted from little formal education beyond primary school. An anticlerical and Socialist activist, Crassous had been involved in a series of winegrowers' strikes in the years leading up to his military service in 1913. Crassous first saw combat on the Western Front in the 61st I.R., part of the much maligned 15th Army Corps. After fighting at Verdun and the Somme, he was transferred to the *Armée d'Orient* in January 1917 and contributed to military operations in Greece and Serbia. He returned to France in July 1918 and served until his demobilization in the summer of 1919.

Crassous's diaries never shied away from the horrors of war and recounted, at times in graphic details, his encounter with industrial warfare. As critical of his commanders as most other *poilus*, he resented any infringement of the equality among combattants. In September 1917, he wrote to the Socialist *Député* of Béziers to protest the implementation of policies on leave, underlining the paradoxical persistence, in a war for “Law and Justice”, of inequalities in the treatment of soldiers.[[35]](#footnote-35)

In this first letter, written to his parents on 1 August 1914 - “a fateful time, an anxious time, a criminal moment”, Crassous harbored no illusion about a war which would bring about “the most awful atrocities, the cruelest sufferings”. Yet he went on to express his hope that it might “bring about eternal Peace and the welfare of humankind”. Crassous here echoed the majority of French Socialists who had resigned themselves to war, in the hope that the defeat of German militarism would consolidate and spread democracy across Europe.[[36]](#footnote-36) In another letter sent on 9 March 1915, he castigated *“those damned boches, whose might and atrocities cannot not hide”* their precarious military position. Keen to reassure his parents, he exhorted them to *“trust in the future, so we will have the joy to see each other again in perfect health.[[37]](#footnote-37)”*

Yet his letters and diaries also reveal a more personal and indeed mundane vision of the war:

A thousand farewells with hope of return, for I leave happy to be defending your persons, your property.[[38]](#footnote-38)

Notwithstanding his ideological understanding of the war, Crassous clearly construed it as a defensive conflict. At stake was not just the future of the Republic and of progressive politics, but the safety of one's own and of one's home. Indeed Crassous did primarily see the war through the conventional lens of class, occupation, and local identity. Fighting in Champagne in the fall of 1915, the winegrower took the time to remark on grape harvest in the region and did defy the military curfew to pick a few of those grapes.[[39]](#footnote-39) In Greece and then in Serbia, he kept on reporting on the state of vineyards as he fought, on foreign lands, for the safeguard of the *patrie*.[[40]](#footnote-40) Interestingly, and despite its gruelling experience of war on the Western Front, Crassous strongly resented its time in south-east Europe and longed to “live again under the beautiful sun of the *Midi[[41]](#footnote-41).*” As the arrival of new Major appeared to raise his morale, he expressed his *“desire”* to *“spend the grape-harvest at home”*, for the first time in four long years.[[42]](#footnote-42) On 29 August 1919, the entry in his war diary succinctly noted his return home, where many, including his parents, had started another harvest.

Understated and construed through the lens of class and local identities, Crassous' undeniable patriotism largely eschewed the language of nationalism. The unpublished diary written by another soldier from the area - a left-wing agricultural labourer named Emile Jourdan - raises questions usually neglected by those content to confine the discussion to an alternative nationalism/anti-patriotism. Jourdan's family history was intimately bound up with the political and social struggles of the region. His brother was among the mutineer of the 17th I.R. in 1907 and had been sent to Tunisia as a punishment.[[43]](#footnote-43) As Crassous and indeed the majority of combatants did, Jourdan equated his war experience with misery and suffering. By contrast to Crassous' diaries, his never explicitly use patriotic vocabulary. And yet in one of the darkest periods of his service in February 1916 he complains, like any good anti-clerical republican would, of the “propaganda” of chaplains. “Poor Republic”, he writes on 13 February 1916,

“if you don't realize this soon enough, this clique will try to destroy you since many of your defenders will have disappeared, unlike those shirkers, nurses or stretcher-bearers at the rear or in jésuitières that the Dalbiez Law will never reach”.[[44]](#footnote-44)

In drawing such a stark opposition between shirking non-combatants or clerics and the defenders of the Republic, Jourdan articulated a rather common Republican vision of patriotic duty, shorn of the rhetoric of nationalism, but imbued with commitment to a defensive war.

To the historian of the First World War, the absence of conventional markers of nationalism or patriotism in many combatant and civilian testimonies begs the question of the very existence of patriotism in wartime.

Historians and literary scholars have long established how the “high diction” of nationalism collapsed when confronted to the realities of industrial warfare.[[45]](#footnote-45) By contrast, the testimonies of anti-militarist and internationalist soldiers like Louis Barthas have retained a paradigmatic prominence in both collective memory and the historiography. Yet they remain just as problematic as the writings of militant nationalists. After all, Barthas's remarkable testimony was rewritten over a lengthy period after his demobilization. As the introduction to the original 1978 edition indicates, Barthas sat down every night to rewrite and consign his wartime recollections to notebooks supplemented with postcards and pictures. While Rémy Cazals invites us to accept the family's claim that Barthas never amended his original testimony, both the linguistic quality and political consistency of the work clearly undermine it. Although this does not diminish the undeniable value of this testimony, it nonetheless underlines the political nature of Barthas' undertaking. Though his diaries may not have been intended for publication, their rewriting in the relative privacy of his home was as much a performance as the rhetorical flag-waving of any nationalist writer.

The local and indeed individual appropriation of the national military experience was therefore an important aspect of the dynamic of cultural mobilization in wartime France. Yet evoking as I have done thus far the geography of patriotic mobilization should not downplay the national purchase of the rhetoric of the ‘blood tax' that was inseparable from the revolutionary notion of ‘levée en masse'.[[46]](#footnote-46)

**4- The ethics of urban mobilization**

The cultures of war in 1914-18 were grounded into the moral superiority that each camp claimed to embody. Yet, the ethics of mobilization also ran deeper and helped define and regulate behaviours and social relations within the belligerent societies. Here again, the cultural dynamic of mobilization stemmed from the transformations of warfare, for the totalizing logic of the conflicts led to the emergence of specific norms of wartime social life. The mobilization of the home fronts thus prompted the emergence of new divisions, new categories within the belligerent citizenry whose respective positions were evoked in terms of duty and defined by the wartime “social relations of sacrifice”. Accordingly, the front-line soldier stood out as the main character and role model of a wartime narrative that designed the ideal civilian comportment as the daily life translation of duty, sacrifice and solidarity. The demands of industrial warfare were such that the material comfort of the home front populations was not merely compromised as a gesture of solidarity with the soldiers at the front; it was expected to become a casualty of the war. The material deprivations soon added to the military losses to foster a growing sense of victimization on the home fronts. The dialectical articulation of victimization and participation thus structured the perception and behaviour patterns which ultimately determined the level and form of social mobilization, as attested for instance by the reception of refugees from the north and eastern regions.[[47]](#footnote-47) The experience of those who had fled the combat zones to seek refuge in other parts of the country sheds light on the moral underpinning of wartime patriotism.

Up to the beginning of 1915, refugees symbolized the war culture and their fate represented the barbaric German warfare. Thronging to the rear, they were at this time considered as heroic victims of German militarism and were treated as such; supporting refugees was therefore elevated to a prime patriotic duty by national authorities and civil society alike. Yet, from 1915 onwards, tensions surfaced and incidents broke out between the Belgians and their hosts. “Boches du Nord”, “Dirty Belgians”, “German” and other abuses were hurled at the exiles that unsurprisingly resented them and prompted their representatives to stand up for due respect.[[48]](#footnote-48)

Reinforced by deep and reciprocal ignorance as well as linguistic or legal marks of otherness, the refugees were no longer granted any discriminating quality in the system of representations that had underpinned the initial reception. When every family was now facing grief and mourning, refugees found themselves accused of enjoying a safe and idle stay as well as of grim opportunism.

Local populations no longer ascribed to them any dignifying quality and increasingly demanded from them a total participation in the war effort.[[49]](#footnote-49)

The refugees from Alsace-Lorraine and the northern regions actually suffered slanders from their southern fellow citizens who mistook them for German-speaking persons and hurled at them the infamous abuse: ‘Boche' (‘Hun'). Evidence garnered from postal control bore out the recurrence of these feuds, asserting that the ‘gap between the North and the South (Midi) seemed to grow wider'.[[50]](#footnote-50) In fact, social mobilizations rested on discriminatory processes that may have turned out to be successively inclusive and exclusive and were at any rate, rooted in the social fabric of the belligerent societies and strongly correlated to the pre-war national unification. In this case, regional differentiation reinforced specific tensions created by the war.

More generally, as the war dragged on, a series of distinct ‘characters', dominated by the towering figure of the soldier in arms came to embody the ethics of mobilization, creating a “language of social morality (what is felt to be ‘fair' or ‘unjust', acceptable or unacceptable)” which regulated “relations between social actors.[[51]](#footnote-51) ” The munitions worker, the nurse, the shirker, to name but a few, thus presented distinctive figures of mobilization, however positive or negative, that corresponded to specific levels of participation in the war effort. Across belligerent societies one figure, that of “profiteer”, became the paradigmatic embodiment of this language.[[52]](#footnote-52) Suspicions were first likely to be attached to those who had been spared from military. Even in countries where conscription was in place, age and physical fitness were not always enough to avoid bitter recriminations, particularly as women's contribution to the wartime economy and society challenged conventional gendered definition of patriotic service.[[53]](#footnote-53) Beside military service, the issue of fair access to foodstuff and other material resources lay at the core of accusations of profiteering. There is no room to elaborate on this, but I would suggest denunciations of profiteering or shirking - other people's profiteering - is a negative definition of one's own definition of patriotism.

Similar dynamics were at work across all belligerent societies and France is no exception here. Wartime patriotism was the product of the nation's cultural geography, of pre-existing political cultures, and of the specific ethics of wartime mobilization that cut across local and national communities.

**5- Wartime politics**

Urban politics in 1914-18 is quite an elusive object since the disruptions brought about by the war substantially modified the urban polity. The suspension of the electoral process as well as the curtailment of the public sphere by censorship, propaganda or material hardships were obvious demonstrations of wartime changes. Likewise, the conscription of political activists had strong implications for local political life.

The study of urban civil society in France demonstrates the necessity to revaluate the role of contention and social conflicts. It constitutes an invitation to take issue with what one may call “the consensual view” of wartime mobilization; the surprisingly prevalent idea that wartime mobilization stemmed from the “Union Sacrée”, the “party truce”, or from a rather improbable national consensus. As a result, social conflicts are exclusively understood as a crisis; a sure sign that the mobilization was gradually unravelling in the face of the demands of industrial warfare. However, social mobilization was a more dynamic process in which social conflicts performed a critical function.

Contrary to traditional interpretations, the wartime growth of the state's apparatus and intervention did not strip the local civil societies of their mediating role. Indeed, a closer look at local associations discloses the extent to which the war altered the social location of power and therefore shifted political conflicts into the realm of voluntary organizations. The organizations of the urban civil society were contentious spaces that partially made up for the wartime curtailment of the public sphere.[[54]](#footnote-54)

Social conflicts raise numerous questions because they translated the new kinds of political problems entailed by the war. The social relations of sacrifice took on political dimensions because the issues of recruiting and conscription, of the organization of labour, of the supply and shortages of food or coal undermined the legitimacy of authority on national and local levels alike. A series of strikes highlighted these political challenges in Béziers in 1917-1918.[[55]](#footnote-55) Across the battle front, the urban history of Germany has similarly highlighted the critical nature of such conflicts over the access and distribution of essential resources.[[56]](#footnote-56) Part and parcel of the process of mobilization, these conflicts enabled belligerent societies, by way of strikes and protest, to articulate the conditions of their commitment to the war effort. A continuing process of negotiation and bargaining thus manufactured popular consent to a war effort elaborated as much through struggles and conflicts as through outspoken support.[[57]](#footnote-57)

The study of urban mobilization thus enriches our understanding of wartime politics. It also invites to look afresh at the impact of the wartime mobilization on conventional conceptions of citizenship and of the State.

French Republicanism, however, was built upon individual – as opposed to communitarian – autonomy and on the primacy of the Nation State. In other words, this form of universalist Republicanism leaves little conceptual room – if any at all – for intermediary bodies and communities to play a mediating role between the individual citizen and the Nation-State. As a result the “articulation of political universalism and the diversity of opinions and identities”, or as Cécile Laborde put it, “how to represent the social in the Republic” raises particular historical challenges.[[58]](#footnote-58) Specifically, this framework of analysis, inherited from the Third Republic's language of politics, hampers historical investigations into the local dimensions of citizenship.

The functions of social regulation performed by urban elites in wartime enable the historian to investigate the political dimensions of social mobilization that lay beyond party politics. Social conflicts revealed the tensions provoked by the wartime economic disruptions but also reveal significant changes in the structure of political participation. When seamstresses went on strike in Béziers in 1915 and 1917, they asked the mayor to forward their demands to their main customer, the military.[[59]](#footnote-59) The fact that such a political mediation was performed by local elites is not very surprising. It reveals the extent to which the French structure of authority based on the concept of popular sovereignty had been internalized since the onset of the Third Republic. What is more interesting in the case of the seamstresses' strikes is that their gender had excluded them from formal participation in the electoral process and from the mainstream of political life.

As Charles Tilly has demonstrated, the evolution of warfare and its growing demands for material resources and organizational reforms accounted for the formation and development of State structures in Europe. While ‘the organization of coercion and preparation for war' constituted the State's main objectives and functions, the raising of mass armies and the advent of industrial warfare contributed to the extension and gradual empowerment of citizenry.[[60]](#footnote-60) Thus, Tilly sets out to explain ‘how war made states and vice versa,' and suggests how the preparation for war and war making affected the polity as a whole including urban civil society within which, this chapter contends, the respective demands of the state and the citizenry were mediated. The First World War dramatically reinforced the terms of the social contract to which ‘citizenship' refers; it also underlined the central place of negotiation, bargaining, and conflict in the organization of solidarity and in the operations of the State's coercitive apparatus.

The history of the wartime state has largely and rightly focused on the national administrative structures and governmental agencies.[[61]](#footnote-61) The comparative urban history of mobilization supplements this perspective with an investigation into the adaptation of public services in the exceptional circumstances of the conflict. Civil society provided many of the material or human resources so needed by the state. From strict control to flexible partnership, circumstances dictated the attitude of the State towards civil society organization. Circumstances if not universal goodwill imposed cooperation; even in France where the prefects, the local representatives of the government were traditionally reluctant to cede or share any of their prerogatives to civil society. Due to the limitations of administrative bodies disorganized by the military mobilization, the assistance to soldiers' dependents and war victims was ensured by civil society organizations organized in each locality.[[62]](#footnote-62) In 1916 the French government strengthened the legislative framework in which voluntary organizations had been operating with a law passed on 30 May 1916 to regulate the activities of “charities calling upon public generosity”[[63]](#footnote-63) .

Most interestingly perhaps, the necessities of war and the structure of military recruitment forced a temporary redefinition of the contours of the local state.

There is no need here to discuss at length the indisputable expansion of state agency entailed by the nature of an industrial conflict waged on a global scale.[[64]](#footnote-64) Yet, local, national, and comparative studies have demonstrated how voluntary organizations compensated for the shortcomings of the State, proving indispensable in the mobilization of the material and cultural resources of the nation, and even benefiting from the war.[[65]](#footnote-65) Historians of the state have even stressed the necessity and importance of the ‘state's ability to secure the consent of key groups in civil society'.[[66]](#footnote-66)

The degree to which the French state cooperated with – and indeed relied on – civil society during the war has led me to insist on the “pragmatic pluralism” demonstrated by the Third Republic in 1914-1918. Born out of necessity, such pragmatism was also born out of opportunity. In this regard too, the structure of military participation in the communities under scrutiny had a significant political impact. When the number of enlisted men as a percentage of the male population of military age hovered around 80% in France, as opposed to 53% in Britain, the political availability of the younger cohorts was significantly curtailed in the former countries.[[67]](#footnote-67) Therefore, military recruitment reinforced the social determinants of a political system that already put a premium on the accumulation of social capital and financial resources. This point stresses the importance for historians of political life to pay closer attention to the sociological determinants of collective action. The Great War did not usher in any major upheaval, any redefinition of the organizing and managing principles of the Republican State. Civil society was literally embodied by groups and individuals who were perfectly integrated into the Third Republic political system. There is no need for a detailed prosopography of urban elites to note the pre-eminence of teachers, lawyers, and other professionals. The over-representation of traditional republican elites was simply reinforced by the structures of military recruitment. The unitary republican state could give pluralism its chance since military mobilization had, de facto, transformed urban political sociology and all but eliminated oppositional groups and activists.

The social and political proximity between these urban elites and the upper echelons of the state administration account for the latitude granted to voluntary organizations by the prefectoral administration. The war challenged institutional and normative definition of the Republican State and vindicates the pragmatic approach to public service embraced by Léon Duguit.[[68]](#footnote-68) For Duguit argued that the modern State was, in the era of the Great War, better understood not as a set of coercive institution, but as a provider of public services:

“The modern State increasingly appears as a group of individuals working in a concerted fashion to meet the material and moral needs of participants, under the leadership and control of governing authorities; the notion of public service is thus substituted to that that of public might; the State ceases to be an authority that orders to become a group that works.”[[69]](#footnote-69)

—————

For the best part of thirty years, the historiography of the French experience of the Great War has focussed the cultural dynamics of wartime mobilization. Scholars continue to argue over the existence and importance of a specific “war culture” that not only turned national sentiment into a powerful mobilizing device, but also accounted for French resilience in the face of industrial warfare. Much paradoxically however, patriotism - both as a category of analysis and as an object of study - has remained a marginal concern. Likewise, French historians of the war rarely engage with historical and social scientific approches to nationalism and nationhood.[[70]](#footnote-70) In a recent study devoted to the frontline encounter between intellectuals and working-class soldiers, Nicolas Mariot does however scrutinize combatants' patriotism from the viewpoint of the educated minority. Anxious to challenge the notion that the war experience brought classes and social groups together, Mariot also relies on the testimonies of combatant intellectuals to argue that the resilience of combatants cannot be take as evidence of their patriotism.[[71]](#footnote-71) Unfortunately, his conviction that state coercion is sufficient to account for soldiers' tenacity prevents him from going beyond the idealistic acception of patriotism adopted by intellectuals.[[72]](#footnote-72) Yet as this chapter has shown, patriotism was a sense of belonging and loyalty, whose assertion rarely chimed in with the rhetoric favored by intellectuals and nationalists alike.

Although expressed in the most mundane words and habits, French patriotism in the First World War should neither be equated with the “banal nationalism” that Michael Billig deconstructed so effectively. For nationalism invokes an ideological coherence as well as the systematic primacy of the Nation, it fails to render the characteristics of patriotism. Billing's critical work also ignores the potential of patriotism to sustain social mobilization against the state.[[73]](#footnote-73) Indeed, as this chapter has argued, the mobilization of urban identities did not necessarily set them in a collision course with national mobilization, even when protesters took on state authorities. In fact, the experience of Béziers would suggest that the resilience of the national polity proceeded from the capacity of the French political system to accommodate such assertion of local identity. The relationship between the national centre and the urban periphery was one of collaboration and integration as well as one of resistance and open conflicts. For patriotism was and should be understood in both an anthropological and legal-political sense, as a performance of solidarity to kith and kin; as a performance of loyalty to an imagined community of fellow citizens. Nationalism - both as a political project and as category of analysis - is intimately bound up with the demands that the state may place on the citizenry. By contrast, patriotism underline the capacity to mobilize nationhood to assert distance towards the state and even to resist its authority.

The perspective adopted here emphatically rejects the essentialist definitions of identities propounded by regionalist or nationalist movements. It rests on a pragmatic and pluralist approach to communal, local and national identities. As a result, identities are here defined as cognitive as well as political resources, which enabled agents to make sense of their experience, and which were mobilized in a contingent manner to carry out particular social or political agendas. The success of wartime national mobilization did not rest on an improbable national consensus, but on the capacity of patriots of all hues to reconcile their diverging understandings of the national project to defend the existence of the nation-state. In this context, social movements performed a critical role, allowing social groups to assert the condition of their participation to the war effort.

As the urban history of the First World War enjoys a revival, the approach adopted here demonstrates that the belligerent communities both relied on and transformed the multi-layered fabric that tied individuals and groups to the imagined national community. In fact, the process of mobilization hinged on urban and infra-national solidarities that did not undermine the nation at war but ultimately reinforced the resilience of the belligerent nation at large. It is hoped that this chapter will have convincingly stressed the necessity to place wartime patriotism into the larger context of the modernization and nationalization of Europe that characterized the long nineteenth century.

Agulhon, Maurice. “Conscience Nationale et Régionale de 1815 À Nos Jours.” In *Histoire Vagabonde*, edited by Maurice Agulhon, 144–73. Paris: Gallimard, 1988.

Applegate, Celia. *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat*. Berkeley - Oxford: University of California Press, 1990.

Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane. *Les Combattants Des Tranchées*. Histoire de La Presse. Paris: A. Colin, 1986.

Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane, and Annette Becker. *14-18: Retrouver La Guerre*. Paris: Gallimard, 2000.

Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane, and Jean-Jacques Becker. *La France, La Nation, La Guerre : 1850-1920*. Regards Sur l’Histoire. Paris: SEDES, 1995.

Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane, and Jean Jacques Becker, eds. *Les Sociétés Européennes et La Guerre de 1914-1918*. Nanterre: Centre d’histoire de la France contemporaine / Université de Paris X - Nanterre, 1990.

Barthas, Louis. *Poilu: The World War I Notebooks of Louis Barthas, Barrelmaker, 1914-1918*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.

Becker, Jean-Jacques. *1914 : Comment Les Français Sont Entrés Dans La Guerre.* Paris: FNSP, 1977.

Bertrand, Romain. *Mémoires D’empire: La Controverse Autour Du Fait Colonial*. Collection Savoir/agir. Bellecombe-en-Bauge: Croquant, 2006.

Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage, 1995.

Bock, Fabienne. “L’exubérance de l’Etat En France de 1914 À 1918.” *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’Histoire*, no. 3 (1984): 41–51.

Bouloc, François, Rémy Cazals, and André Loez, eds. *Identités Troublées: 1914-1918, Les Appartenances Sociales et Nationales À L’épreuve de La Guerre*. Regards Sur L’histoire. Toulouse: Privat, 2011.

Cazals, Rémy. “1914-1918 : Oser Penser, Oser Écrire.” *Genèses*, no. 46 (2002): 26–43.

———. *Les Mots de 14-18*. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 2003.

Chanet, Jean-François. *L’école Républicaine et Les Petites Patries*. Paris: Aubier, 1996.

Chickering, Roger. *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914-1918*. Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Confino, Alon. *The Nation as a Local Metaphor. Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871-1918*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

Cronin, James. “The Crisis of State and Society in Britain, 1917-22.” In *Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions in an International Perspective. Strikes Waves in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, edited by Leopold H. Haimson and Charles Tilly, 457–76. Cambridge - Paris: CUP - MSH, 1989.

Davis, Belinda Joy. *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Denis, Gwendal, ed. *Mémoire et trauma de la Grande Guerre: Bretagne, Catalogne, Corse, Euskadi, Occitanie*. Brest - Rennes: Centre de recherche bretonne et celtique, 2010.

Duguit, Léon. *L’Etat, Le Droit Objectif et La Loi Positive [1901]*. Paris: Dalloz, 2003.

———. *Traité de Droit Constitutionnel*. Vol. I. 2 vols. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1927.

Faron, Olivier. *Les Enfants Du Deuil: Orphelins et Pupilles de La Nation de La Première Guerre Mondiale, 1914-1941*. Paris: La Découverte, 2001.

Gildea, Robert. *Children of the Revolution : The French, 1799-1914*. London: Allen Lane, 2008.

Goebel, Stefan. “Forging the Industrial Home Front in Germany: Iron-Nail Memorials in the Ruhr.” In *Uncovered Fields. Perspectives in First World War Studies*, edited by Pierre Purseigle and Jenny Macleod, 159–78. Leiden - Boston: Brill, 2004.

Green, S.J.D., and R.C. Whiting, eds. *The Boundaries of State in Modern Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Gregory, Adrian. “Lost Generations: The Impact of Military Casualties on Paris, London, and Berlin.” In *Capital Cities at War. Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919*, edited by Jay M. Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, I:57–103. Cambridge: CUP, 1997.

———. *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Horne, John. “‘L’impôt Du Sang’. Republican Rhetoric and Industrial Warfare in France, 1914-1918.” *Social History* 14, no. 2 (1989): 201–23.

———. “Social Identity in War: France, 1914-1918.” In *Men, Women and War*, edited by T.G. Fraser and Keith Jeffery, 119–35. Historical Studies. Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1993.

Hurwitz, S. J. *State Intervention in Great Britain. A Study of Economic Control and Social Response, 1914-1919*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949.

Jackson, Julian. *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Jeismann, Michael. *La Patrie de L’ennemi. La Notion D’ennemi National et La Représentation de La Nation En Allemagne et En France de 1792 À 1918*. Paris: CNRS Editions, 1997.

Laborde, Cécile. “La Citoyenneté.” In *Dictionnaire Critique de La République*, edited by Vincent Duclert and Christophe Prochasson, 116–23. Paris: Flammarion, 2002.

Lafon, Alexandre, and Céline Piot, eds. *Le Midi, Les Midis Dans La IIIe République*. Narrosse: Editions d’Albret / AVN, 2012.

Le Naour, Jean-Yves. *La légende noire des soldats du Midi*. 2nd ed. Echo. Paris: Vendémiaire, 2013.

Loez, André. *14-18, les refus de la guerre: une histoire des mutins*. 1 vols. Folio 174. Paris: Gallimard, 2010.

Lowe, R. “The Erosion of State Intervention in Britain, 1917-1918.” *The Economic History Review* XXXI, no. 2 (1978): 270–86.

Luzzatto, Sergio. *L’impôt Du Sang. La Gauche Française À L’épreuve de La Guerre mondiale.1900-1945*. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1996.

Mariot, Nicolas. *Tous unis dans la tranchée ? 14-18, les intellectuels à la rencontre du peuple*. L’Univers historique. Paris: Seuil, 2013.

Masterman, C.F.G. “The Temper of the People.” *The Contemporary Review*, no. 595 (1915): 1–11.

Maurin, Jules. *Armée - Guerre - Société. Soldats Languedociens (1889-1919)*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982.

Maurin, Jules, and Jean-Charles Jauffret, eds. *La Grande Guerre, 1914-1918. 80 Ans D’historiographie et de Représentations*. Montpellier: Université Paul Valéry, 1998.

Napo, Félix. *1907 : La Révolte Des Vignerons*. Toulouse: Privat, 1971.

Offenstadt, Nicolas. “La Grande Guerre.” In *Historiographies*, edited by Christian Delacroix, François Dosse, Patrick Garcia, and Nicolas Offenstadt, II. Concepts et débats:1062–73. Paris: Gallimard, 2010.

Parker, Peter. *The Old Lie: The Great War and the Public-School Ethos*. London: Constable, 1987.

Pech, Rémy. *Entreprise Viticole et Capitalisme En Languedoc-Roussillon. Du Phylloxéra Aux Crises de Méventes*. Toulouse: Université de Toulouse Le Mirail, 1975.

Pech, Rémy, and Jules Maurin. *1907. Les Mutins de La République*. Toulouse: Privat, 2007.

———. *1907, les mutins de la République: la révolte du Midi viticole : la rumeur de Béziers, 1914-1918*. Toulouse: Éd. Privat, 2013.

Pennell, Catriona. *A Kingdom United. Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland*. Oxford: OUP, 2012.

Prost, Antoine. *Les Anciens Combattants. 1914-1940*. Vol. 3. Archives. Paris: Gallimard/Julliard, 1977.

Purseigle, Pierre. “A Very French Debate: The 1914–1918 ‘war Culture.’” *Journal of War and Culture Studies* 1, no. 1 (2008): 9–14.

———. “‘A Wave onto Our Shores.’ Exile and Resettlement of Western Front Refugees, 1914-1918.” *Contemporary European History* 16, no. 4 (2007): 427–44.

———. “Beyond and below the Nations. Towards a Comparative History of Local Communities at War.” In *Uncovered Fields. Perspectives in First World War Studies*, edited by Jenny Macleod and Pierre Purseigle, 95–123. Boston - Leiden: Brill Academic Publisher, 2004.

———. “Les Associations Locales Face À La Grande Guerre : Société Civile et Etat de Guerre. Etude Comparée Angleterre - France.” In *Guerres et Associations*, edited by Marc Frangi and Bruno Benoit, 87–104. Lyon: PUL, 2003.

———. *Mobilisation, Sacrifice, et Citoyenneté. Angleterre - France, 1900-1918*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013.

———. “The First World War and the Transformations of the State.” *International Affairs* 90, no. 2 (2014): 249–64. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12107.

Renouvin, Pierre. *Les Formes de Gouvernement de Guerre. L’organisation Gouvernementale Française Pendant La Guerre*. Publication de La Dotation Carnegie Pour La Paix Internationale. Paris - New Haven: PUF - Yale University Press, 1925.

Robert, Jean-Louis. “The Image of the Profiteer.” In *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919*, edited by J. M Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, 104–32. Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Rolland, Louis. “Institutions et Services de Solidarité.” *Revue Du Droit Public et de La Science Politique En France et À L’étranger*, no. 1 (1918).

———. “L’administration Locale et La Guerre. Les Faits et Les Idées Directrices.” *Revue Du Droit Public et de La Science Politique En France et À L’étranger*, no. 1 (1915).

Rousseau, Frédéric. *La Guerre Censurée. Une Histoire Des Combattants Européens de 14-18*. Paris: Le Seuil, 1999.

———. *Le Procès Des Témoins de La Grande Guerre. L’Affaire Norton Cru*. Paris: Le Seuil, 2003.

Rowley, Anthony. “Nouvelle Régulation Ou Retour À La Normale ? Le Cas Britannique Après 1918.” *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’Histoire* 3 (1984): 53–68.

Sagnes, Jean. *Le Mouvement Ouvrier Du Languedoc*. Toulouse: Privat, 1980.

———. “Socialisme et Syndicalisme Dans l’Hérault de 1905 À 1921.” Université de Montpellier III, 1976.

Siegel, Mona L. *The Moral Disarmament of France: Education, Pacifism, and Patriotism, 1914-1940*. Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare 18. Cambridge , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Skocpol, Theda, Andrew Karch, Ziad Munson, and Bayliss Camp. “Patriotic Partnerships: Why Great Wars Nourished American Civic Voluntarism.” In *Shaped by War and Trade. International Influences on American Political Development*, edited by Ira Katznelson and Shefter, Martin, 134–80. Princeton - Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Smith, Leonard V. “The ‘Culture de Guerre’ and French Historiography of the Great War of 1914–1918.” *History Compass* 5, no. 6 (2007): 1967–79.

Smith, Leonard V., Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, and Annette Becker. *France and the Great War. 1914-1918*. New Approaches to European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Suquet, Louis. “Souvenirs de La Guerre 1914-1918.” Unpublished memoirs, 1923.

Thiesse, Anne-Marie. *Ils Apprenaient La France. L’exaltation Des Régions Dans Le Discours Patriotique*. Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’homme, 1997.

Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. Oxford - Cambridge (MA): Blackwell, 1990.

———. “The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere.” In *Citizenship, Identity and Social History*, edited by Charles Tilly, 223–36. International Review of Social History Supplement. Cambridge: CUP, 1996.

Tobin, E.H. “War and the Working Class: The Case of Düsseldorf 1914-1918.” *Central European History* 18, no. 3–4 (1985): 257–98.

Verhey, Jeffrey. *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany*. Cambridge: CUP, 2000.

Waldron, Arthur, and Daniel Moran, eds. *The People in Arms : Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Watson, Janet S. K. *Fighting Different Wars : Experience, Memory, and the First World War in Britain*. Cambridge: CUP, 2004.

Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen : The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1979.

Winter, Jay M. “P vs C: The Still Burning Anger When the French Talk of the First World War.” *Times Literary Supplement*, June 16, 2006.

1. Gildea, *Children of the Revolution : The French, 1799-1914*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Suquet, “Souvenirs de La Guerre 1914-1918.”, p. 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Becker, *1914*. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Smith, Audoin-Rouzeau, and Becker, *France and the Great War. 1914-1918*. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. For a useful overwiew of historiographical developments up until 1998, see {"Débat - Au-delà de la « contrainte » ou du « consentement »", 2014Maurin and Jauffret, *La Grande Guerre, 1914-1918. 80 Ans D’historiographie et de Représentations*; Purseigle, “A Very French Debate: The 1914–1918 ‘war Culture’”; Smith, “The ‘Culture de Guerre’ and French Historiography of the Great War of 1914–1918”; Winter, “P vs C: The Still Burning Anger When the French Talk of the First World War.” [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *De La Guerre Comme Affrontement Historiographique*. Rendez-Vous de l’Histoire. Blois, 2013. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=23B5YSdux6c>. “Les Soldats de 14-18 Ont-Ils Consenti À La Guerre?” *Le Huffington Post*, February 12, 2014. <http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/frederic-rousseau/debat-grande-guerre_b_4440655.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *Retrouver La Guerre*; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *La France, La Nation, La Guerre : 1850-1920*; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *Les Sociétés Européennes*; Jeismann, *La Patrie de L’ennemi. La Notion D’ennemi National et La Représentation de La Nation En Allemagne et En France de 1792 À 1918*. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Cazals, “1914-1918 : Oser Penser, Oser Écrire”; Cazals, *Les Mots de 14-18*; Loez, *14-18, les refus de la guerre*; Offenstadt, “La Grande Guerre”; Rousseau, *La Guerre Censurée. Une Histoire Des Combattants Européens de 14-18*; Rousseau, *Le Procès Des Témoins de La Grande Guerre. L’Affaire Norton Cru*. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. This development is all the more surprising that patriotism was central to as seminal a work as Antoine Prost's book on French veterans. it is also at the heart of Mona Siegel's study of French primary teachers. Prost, *Les Anciens Combattants. 1914-1940*; Siegel, *The Moral Disarmament of France*. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Audoin-Rouzeau, *Les Combattants Des Tranchées*. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. One notable exception is Nicolas Mariot whose latest book explicitly addresses this question and will be discussed below. Mariot, *Tous unis dans la tranchée ?*. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Lafon and Piot, *Le Midi, Les Midis Dans La IIIe République*. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Bertrand, *Mémoires D’empire*. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Denis, *Mémoire et trauma de la Grande Guerre*. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat*; Chanet, *L’école Républicaine et Les Petites Patries*; Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor. Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871-1918*; Thiesse, *Ils Apprenaient La France*. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Pech and Maurin, *Les Mutins*., p. 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Sagnes, “Socialisme et Syndicalisme.”, 214, 730. Archives Départementales de l'Hérault (thereafter ADH), Par 1600 1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Pech, *Entreprise Viticole et Capitalisme En Languedoc-Roussillon. Du Phylloxéra Aux Crises de Méventes*; Sagnes, *Mouvement Ouvrier*.. Archives Nationales de France (thereafter AN), F1c III 1128 *Rapports de préfets sur l'esprit public, la vie économique et la vie politique. Rapport du Préfet de l'Hérault au Ministre de l'Intérieur*, 10 March 1923. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. A.D.H. Par 791, 1 May 1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*., p. 486 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Speech made in Perpignan, quoted Napo, *La Révolte*., pp. 244-246 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Agulhon, “Conscience Nationale et Régionale de 1815 À Nos Jours”; Pech and Maurin, *Les Mutins*; ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Becker, *1914*; Gregory, *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War*; Pennell, *A Kingdom United*; Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914*. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. On the performative dimensions of patriotism, see the respective chapters of John Horne and Melissa Stockdale in this volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *Retrouver La Guerre*. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. ADH 2 R 783: *Journée de l'Hérault* (15 October 1916) *au profit exclusif des œuvres de guerre du département, organisée par le préfet et les municipalités.* [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Bouloc, Cazals, and Loez, *Identités Troublées*., p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Chickering, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany*; Goebel, “Forging the Industrial Home Front in Germany: Iron-Nail Memorials in the Ruhr”; Purseigle, “Beyond and below the Nations. Towards a Comparative History of Local Communities at War”; Purseigle, *Mobilisation, Sacrifice, et Citoyenneté. Angleterre - France, 1900-1918*. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. For comprehensive and comparative discussion of this question, see Waldron and Moran, *The People in Arms*. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Maurin, *Armée - Guerre - Société*., p. 379 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. For two recent studies, see Le Naour, *La légende noire des soldats du Midi*; Pech and Maurin, *1907, les mutins de la République*. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. A.M.B. ID 104, extraordinary meeting, 26 October 1917. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. At long last, the book has now been translated into English. Barthas, *Poilu*. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Crassous-Purseigle Family archives, Georges Crassous Papers, Diary Entry, 29 September 1917. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Crassous-Purseigle Family archives, Georges Crassous Papers, Letter 1 August 1914. Luzzatto, *L’impôt Du Sang*. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Crassous-Purseigle Family archives, Georges Crassous Papers, Letter 9 March 1915 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Crassous-Purseigle Family archives, Georges Crassous Papers, Letter 1 August 1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Crassous-Purseigle Family archives, Georges Crassous Papers, Diary entries 19 and 22 September 1915. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Crassous-Purseigle Family archives, Georges Crassous Papers, Diary entries, 21 July and 2 August 1917. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Crassous-Purseigle Family archives, Georges Crassous Papers, Diary entry, 28-31 May 1918. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Crassous-Purseigle Family archives, Georges Crassous Papers, Diary entry, 28-31 May 1918. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. The fate of these mutineers is detailed in Pech and Maurin, *1907, les mutins de la République*.. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Archives Départementales de l'Hérault, 1 J 1717 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Parker, *The Old Lie*. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Horne, “L’impôt Du Sang.” [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Purseigle, “A Wave onto Our Shores.” [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Archives Départementales de l'Hérault 3R33 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Archives Départementales de l'Hérault 3 R 2\* [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre 16N1536 ‘L'état de l'opinion du 15 juin au 15 juillet' and 7N868 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Horne, “Social Identity.” [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Robert, “The Image of the Profiteer.” [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Watson, *Fighting Different Wars*. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Purseigle, “Les Associations Locales Face À La Grande Guerre : Société Civile et Etat de Guerre. Etude Comparée Angleterre - France.” [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. ADH, 10 M 244-245 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Chickering, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany*; Davis, *Home Fires Burning*; Tobin, “War and the Working Class: The Case of Düsseldorf 1914-1918.” [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*., p. 102; Tilly, “Emergence of Citizenship.”, p. 229. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Laborde, “La Citoyenneté.”, p. 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. AMB VII F ; Subsequent strikes over similar problems are documented by the collections of the ADH 10M 244-245 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*., p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Bock, “L’exubérance de l’Etat En France de 1914 À 1918”; Cronin, “The Crisis of State and Society in Britain, 1917-22”; Green and Whiting, *The Boundaries of State in Modern Britain*; Hurwitz, *State Intervention in Great Britain. A Study of Economic Control and Social Response, 1914-1919*; Lowe, “The Erosion of State Intervention in Britain, 1917-1918”; Renouvin, *Les Formes de Gouvernement de Guerre. L’organisation Gouvernementale Française Pendant La Guerre*; Rowley, “Nouvelle Régulation Ou Retour À La Normale ? Le Cas Britannique Après 1918.” [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Rolland, “L’administration Locale et La Guerre.” [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. For an analysis of the *Loi du 30 mai 1916*, see Rolland, “Institutions et Services de Solidarité.” [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Purseigle, “The First World War and the Transformations of the State.” [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. For a contemporary perspective on British voluntarism see Masterman, “The Temper of the People.”; On the assistance to war orphans in France see Faron, *Les Enfants Du Deuil: Orphelins et Pupilles de La Nation de La Première Guerre Mondiale, 1914-1941*.; On American voluntarism, Skocpol et al., “Patriotic Partnerships: Why Great Wars Nourished American Civic Voluntarism.” [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Cronin, “The Crisis of State and Society in Britain, 1917-22.”, p. 459. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Gregory, “Lost Generations: The Impact of Military Casualties on Paris, London, and Berlin.” [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Léon Duguit offered a first iteration of his doctrine in 1901. Duguit, *L’Etat, Le Droit Objectif et La Loi Positive [1901]*. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Duguit, *Traité de Droit Constitutionnel*. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. By contrast, see Purseigle, *Mobilisation, Sacrifice, et Citoyenneté. Angleterre - France, 1900-1918*. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Mariot, *Tous unis dans la tranchée ?*.. Remarkable in many ways, the book's overall historiographical argument suffers from its systematic reduction of the historiography of the Great War to the world of S. Audoin-Rouzeau and A. Becker. It effectively hinges on a critique of the former's first book. See Audoin-Rouzeau, *Les Combattants Des Tranchées*. and Mariot, *Tous unis dans la tranchée ?*., p. 393 [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Ibid., pp. 11, 24, 272, 291, 366 [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)